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Motivation
 The family context is likely to play a role in the 
relationship between socioeconomic status and health:
a. The economic situation of other family members plays a 
role in determining individual levels of health (Burgess, 
1945; Gardner and Oswald, 2004; Cai and Kalb, 2006)
b. The decision-making process in a family has an 
important bearing on the intra-household dynamics and 
welfare of the household (Sundari, 2013)
Thus….
 Family arrangements in terms of resource allocation and 
decision-making are likely to affect individual levels of 
health.
Motivation
Objective:
 To contribute to the literature on the fields of health and 
household economics by analysing the impact of 
different household financial regimes on the health 
status of males and females in a number of European 
countries. 
Motivation
This investigation is interesting for a number of reasons:
1. Understanding the different pathways between 
individual socioeconomic status and health becomes 
of special relevance in choosing the most appropriate 
public policies aimed at improving the well-being of a 
society.
Motivation
This investigation is interesting for a number of reasons:
2. The prevalence and duration of health problems place 
a considerable burden on health and social care 
systems.
The cost of depression in the European Economic Area has 
been estimated at €136.3 billion, of which around one third falls 
on the health care system (McDaid et al., 2008).
Motivation
This investigation is interesting for a number of reasons:
3. The nature of intra-household arrangements is of 
relevance for the design of focalized social 
programmes that aim at raising people’s well-being, 
allowing one to assess whether policy will be effective.
Motivation
This investigation is interesting for a number of reasons:
4. It is important to pay special attention to the gender 
dimension:
a. women today are still at higher risks of financial strain 
due to their position in the labour force, family role, and 
lower earnings.
b. there is evidence of higher prevalence of mental health 
problems, such as depression, among women compared 
to men (Mirowsky and Ross, 1989).
Motivation
The main results can be summarized as follows:
 There is evidence of the collective model assumption, 
suggesting that the income-pooling hypothesis (unitary 
approach) is not always supported and that significant 
inequalities might exist within the same family.
 Specifically, each member of the couple is worse off if 
his/her partner has most decision-making 
responsibilities. 
Motivation
The main results can be summarized as follows:
 The presence of children in the household plays a role 
in the effect that household financial regimens exert on 
individual self-assessed health, especially among 
females.
Outline
 Overview of the literature on the socioeconomic 
gradient in health and intra-household decision-making 
processes.
 Data set and variables description.
 Econometric model and estimation strategy.
 Results.
 Conclusions and discussion.
Literature review
 Monetary and material deprivation as determinants 
of health
 Lower absolute income has been found to have an 
adverse impact on health (Frijters et al., 2005; 
Subramanian and Kawachi, 2006; Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2006; Kiuila and Mieszkowski, 2007; and Gunasekara, et 
al., 2011)
 Deprivation in terms of material hardship, such as access 
to material goods and conditions (including food, housing 
and access to amenities, among others), is also likely to 
be a crucial determinant of health (Adamson et al., 2006; 
Ploubidis et al., 2011; and Blázquez et al., 2014, among 
others).
Literature review
 Intra-household resource allocation and decision-
making
 There is extensive literature on the decision-making 
processes and power relations within the family.
 Evidence of a shift from the unitary to the collective 
approach, suggesting that the equally-shared resources 
hypothesis is not always supported and that significant 
inequalities might exist within the same family (Fortin and 
Lacroix, 1997; Clark et al., 2002; Ward-Batts, 2008; 
Cherchye et al., 2009, etc.)
Literature review
 Intra-household resource allocation and decision-
making
 There is extensive literature on the decision-making 
processes and power relations within the family.
 Evidence of gender differences as regards decision-making 
power and responsibility within the household (see for
instance Mader and Schneebaum, 2013). 
Literature review
 SES-health relationship should be addressed under the 
“collective” rather than “unitary” approach.
 The family would involve a distribution of resources that 
may, to some extent, explain the presence of 
inequalities between members of a couple.
 An important distinction within the framework of 
collective models between responsibility for the 
management of household resources and control of 
(major) household decisions (Pahl, 1989; and Wilson, 
1987). 
Literature review
 Pahl (1989) classification of financial regimens:
1. whole-wage system: one partner is responsible for 
handling and managing the family budget. The 
responsible partner has access to and control of all the 
income (earnings and/or social welfare) of the couple. 
2. allowance system: the first partner gives the second 
partner part of his income for basic household 
expenditure and keeps the major part for himself. Thus, 
decision-making responsibilities are totally separated: 
usually the wife is delegated to handling the money for 
domestic expenses while the husband makes the 
strategic decisions. 
Literature review
 Pahl (1989) classification of financial regimens:
3. shared management or pooling system: both partners 
put their income into a common pool, which both have 
access to. It is also characterized by equal decision-
making power and equal responsibility by both partners. 
4. independent management system: both partners have 
income, but they have separate bank accounts and they 
do not have access to each other’s income. There is no 
common budget and each partner has a separate 
sphere of responsibility in terms of financial 
management. 
Data set and variables
Data set
 The 2010 module on intra-household sharing of resources of 
the EUSILC.
 Sample: heterosexual couples, with or without children, for 
21 countries (Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Cyprus, Malt, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak 
Republic). 
 We eliminate couples with inconsistent responses on the 
decision-making variables.
 Separate estimations for males and females
Data set and variables
Variables
 SAH: “How is your health in general?”. Five-point 
response scale ranging from very bad to very good.
 Household income and material deprivation
 Income: household equivalent income.
 Material deprivation: multidimensional index using 9 items 
proposed by Eurostat: paying rent, mortgage or utility 
bills; keeping the home adequately warm; facing 
unexpected expenses; eating meat or proteins regularly; 
going on holiday; a television; a washing machine; a car; 
and a telephone.
Data set and variables
Variables
 Money management and decision-making
Household Information
HA010 (Regime 
of household 
finances)
How are the incomes you receive in your household dealt with?
(All incomes as common resources; Some incomes as common resources and the 
rest as private resources; All incomes as private resources of the person receiving 
them; No income in the household)
Personal Information:  Decision-making          (More me, balanced, more my partner)
PA030: 
(shopping)
Who in your couple is generally more likely to make decisions on everyday 
shopping?
PA040: 
(children’s 
expenses)
Who in your couple is generally more likely to make decisions on important 
expenses to make for the child(ren)?
PA050: 
(furniture etc.)
Who in your couple is generally more likely to make decisions on expensive 
purchases of consumer durables and furniture?
PA060: 
(borrowing) Who in your couple is generally more likely to make decisions on borrowing money?
PA070: 
(savings)
Who in your household is generally more likely to make decisions on saving 
money?
Data set and variables
Variables
 Money management and decision-making
Type of Financial 
Regimen
Income pooling Decision-
making(a)
WholeWage_female all income pooling         HA010=1 Mainly female
WholeWage_male all income pooling         HA010=1 Mainly male
Allowance_female not all income pooling   HA010==2|3 Mainly female
Allowance_male not all income pooling   HA010==2|3 Mainly male
Pooling all income pooling         HA010=1 Shared
Independent not all income pooling   HA010==2|3 Shared
(a) Decisions about shopping, child, durables, borrowing and savings are variables PA030-PA070
Econometric model and 
research strategy
 Probit-adapted ordinary least squares (POLS) (Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008: 29-34))
SAHi yi Di FRi Xi Ci i
Equivalent net 
household income
material household
deprivation
household financial 
regimen
individual and household
characteristics
dummies to control
for clustering
Results
FEMALE MALE
Income 0.036* 0.053**
Deprivation -0.879*** -0.882***
Financial regimen
WholeWage_female 0.028*** -0.022**
WholeWage_male -0.101*** -0.019
Allowance_female 0.003 -0.083***
Allowance_male -0.115*** -0.051*
Independent 0.009 0.007
Pooling (ref. category)
Income_separately 0.040*** 0.050***
Consensual Union 0.069** 0.038
Children 0.077*** 0.040***
Age -1.733*** -3.434***
Age2 -0.320 1.597**
Educational Level
Secondary 0.063*** 0.076***
Tertiary 0.145*** 0.193***
Primary (ref. 
category)
Labour Market Status
Part-time employee -0.039* -0.116***
Unemployed -0.141*** -0.101**
Inactive -0.147*** -0.424***
Full-time employee 
(ref. category)
FEMALE MALE
Partner’s Educational Level
Secondary 0.067** 0.029
Tertiary 0.138*** 0.083***
Primary (ref. category)
Partner’s Labour Market 
Status
Part-time employee -0.001 0.002
Unemployed -0.039 -0.002
Inactive -0.071* 0.059***
Full-time employee 
(ref. category)
Country dummies Yes Yes
Cons 1.096*** 1.501***
N 75385 75385
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Results
FEMALE MALE
Financial Regime
WholeWage_female 0.040** -0.040***
(0.015) (0.007)
WholeWage_male -0.151*** 0.020
(0.017) (0.015)
Allowance_female 0.012 -0.082***
(0.020) (0.021)
Allowance_male -0.106** -0.036
(0.040) (0.028)
Independent 0.035 0.007
(0.022) (0.016)
Interactions
Children*WholeWage_female -0.025 0.037
(0.020) (0.023)
Children*WholeWage_male 0.111*** -0.086***
(0.021) (0.030)
Children*Allowance_female -0.040* -0.004
(0.023) (0.034)
Children*Allowance_male -0.024 -0.046
(0.093) (0.041)
Children*Independent -0.086*** 0.000
(0.026) (0.057)
Conclusions and discussion
 We attempt to contribute to the literature on the fields of 
health and household economics by analyzing the 
intra-household resource allocation and decision-
making on the health status of males and females.
 Family arrangements have important consequences in 
terms of individual SAH. 
Conclusions and discussion
 In particular we find:
 Each member of the couple is worse off if his/her partner 
has most decision-making responsibilities. 
 Females health status improves when they have more 
responsibility in decision-making when all incomes are 
pooled. 
 The presence of children in the household plays an 
important role in the relationship between health and 
household financial regimen, mainly for females. 
Conclusions and discussion
 Implications of our results:
 Control and management of household finances and 
family structure should be taken into account in the 
design of effective policies to improve health of targeted 
members of the household. 
 Gender differences should be also taken into account: 
women usually spend on household rather than on 
personal goods while men are more likely to increase 
personal consumption if their wives are earners.
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